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COMMENT
WORLD WIDE WEB OF
LOVE, LIES, AND LEGISLATION:
WHY ONLINE DATING WEBSITES
SHOULD SCREEN MEMBERS
MAUREEN HORCHER*
INTRODUCTION
Carole Markin met her “match” on Match.com (“Match”).1 Among
the 1.3 million subscribers2 looking for love on Match–20,000 singles
joining daily3–the website filtered through the love-seeking throng and
found a special someone for Carole. His name was Alan Wurtzel,4 and he
was hiding a dark, violent side. Of course Carole did not know that. She
was simply signing online, hoping to meet another potential love connection. After all, the Internet has become one of the most popular places for
lovers to meet;5 love can truly be just a click away. As Carole prepared
for her date with Alan, she had no idea that later that night, her “match”
* Maureen Horcher is a 2013 J.D. candidate at the John Marshall Law School in
Chicago, Illinois. Maureen graduated magna cum laude in 2009 from Bradley Univeristy
in Peoria, Illinois, with a degree in journalism. She would like to thank her parents, Bob
and Michelle Hourcher, for modeling unapologetic faith and love. She would also like to
thank Aaron Koonce, Laura Weiskopf, and Alana Yanagida for their unconditional friendship and guidance.
1. Cristen Conger, Does Online Dating Work?, ABC NEWS/TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 12,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/technology/online-dating-work/story?id=12896317&page=2.
2. Nicholas Jackson, Why Match.com Should Not Have Purchased Dating Website
OkCupid, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 2, 2011, 10:59 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2011/02/why-matchcom-shouldnt-have-purchased-dating-site-okcupid/70651/.
3. Ki Mae Heussner, Should Online Dating Sites Do Background Checks?, ABC NEWS
(July 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/technology/online-dating-sites-background-checks/
story?id=11063166.
4. Conger, supra note 1.
5. Id. (estimating that 23 percent of U.S. couples between 2007 to 2009 met online
and stating, “[m]ore people meet online now than meet through school, work, church, bars,
parties, et cetera.”).
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would brutally rape her in her apartment.6
Unbeknownst to Carole and the rest of the Match dating pool, Alan
was a convicted sex offender.7 In April 2011, Carole filed suit against
Match, alleging that had Match screened its members, she would not
have been raped.8 Alan Wurtzel was not the only unobserved danger
perusing Match. In November 2009, Ryan Logan, a thirty-four year-old
Chicago man, was found guilty of raping a woman he met on Match earlier that year.9 The website experienced further public relations embarrassment when it discovered the criminal history of another user,
Abraham Fortune,10 in a local newspaper.11 His criminal status: convicted murderer.12
According to a Pew Research study, fifty-two percent of online daters
said they do not find online dating dangerous.13 More specifically, “users
feel a certain comfort level that they won’t run into sexual offenders or
other criminals since they’ve paid for the service.”14 Despite that notion,
Match openly opposed screening its members for criminal offenses. In
July 2010, Match’s general manager, Mandy Ginsberg, told ABC News
that Match did not screen members because criminal and sex offender
databases are occasionally inaccurate.15 Screening would thus expose
6. Rachel Quigley, Tired of Hiding: Match.com Victim Speaks out About Ordeal at the
Hands of Convicted Sex Offender She Met on Dating Site, MAIL ONLINE (Apr. 19, 2011, 9:38
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1378621/match-com-rape-victim-carole-markin-speaks-sex-offender.html.
7. Conger, supra note 1.
8. Quigley, supra note 6 (explaining, however, that Wurtzel was a misdemeanor
felon. Even if Match.com had screened him using the federal criminal registry, his name
would not have appeared anyway.).
9. Matthew Walberg, Man Who Used Online Dating Site Convicted of Assault, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 9, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-11-09/news/ct-metmatch-com-rape-20101109_1_sexual-assault-judge-acquits-match-com.
10. Heussner, supra note 3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Online Dating: Summary of Findings, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT
(Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/2006/online-dating/01-summary-offindings.aspx (reporting that forty-three percent of online daters see risk in online dating;
whereas, six percent of online daters think that dating websites do an “excellent” job of
protecting users’ information.).
14. Patrick Danner, Love is Blind When Uninformed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS
(June 24, 2010), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/local/article/love-is-blind-whenuninformed-781503.php#ixzz1aCqbCL4y (reporting that “despite the fact that many online
dating websites don’t perform background checks, users feel a certain comfort level that
they won’t run into sexual offenders or other criminals since they’ve paid for the service”).
15. Heussner, supra note 3 (reporting Match.com’s General Manager Mandy Ginsberg’s statement: “If we provide background checks, can they be accurate? And if they’re
not, do we give a false sense of security to people on the site . . . .That’s the big concern I
have. If someone slips through the cracks . . . does that create more of a risk for people to
not be more prudent?”).
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users to greater safety risks because it would provide them a false sense
of security.16 Nonetheless, in an apparent effort to save face, Match retreated from that stance one year later. As part of Match’s August 2011
settlement with Carole Markin, the website agreed to conduct criminal
background screenings of its members.17 In March 2012, Match, along
with online dating providers eHarmony.com and Spark.com, publicly
agreed to crosscheck subscribers against national sex registries.18 The
agreement is not legally binding or enforceable.19
While Match and others have backed down under public relations
pressure, most dating websites refuse to treat user background checks as
a prevailing trend.20 Dating websites are not legally required to ask subscribers if they are convicted felons, screen members through a criminal
database, or boot convicts from their websites.21 Meanwhile, subscribers
are paying their monthly registration fees, meeting people that the website matches them with, and unknowingly risking violent consequences.
This comment will explore the current immune-from-liability status
of dating websites in subscribing felons and sex offenders to their websites. Additionally, this comment will explain why websites should
screen for felons and sex offenders before matching paying users.
Section II will explore state proposed legislation requiring screening,
which has generally been untried and/or unsuccessful.22 Next, this section will detail current methods besides screening that dating websites
implement to encourage safe dating practices. Section II will also examine the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the controlling federal
legislation protecting websites from liability for allowing convicts to mingle and meet with their customers. This section will illustrate that the
courts and Congress refuse to carve out exceptions to the CDA regarding
user safety, and they claim legitimate policy reasons to do so. This sec16. Id.
17. Quigley, supra note 6.
18. Robert Jablon, Three Online Dating Sites Agree to Screen for Predators, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/wellness/story/201203-21/Three-online-dating-sites-agree-to-screen-for-predators/53683868/1.
19. Id.
20. IADW Opposes Background Check Legislation, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
DATING WEBSITES, http://www.iadw.org/14901.html (Sept. 26, 2011) (opposing screening for
reasons such as a false sense of security and stating, “[a] woman could date a man thinking
he has no criminal record because it was not uncovered by the background check, despite
the fact that he was a murderer or rapist.”).
21. Laura Hampson, Site Singles Out Online Dating’s Heartbreakers, PALM BEACH
POST (Jan. 7, 2011, 7:48 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/site-singles-out-online-datings-heartbreakers-1170777.html (explaining that if users want to know the criminal history of their online dates, they must purchase software or hire investigators).
22. Martha L. Arias, Are Online Dating Sites Regulated by Federal Law?, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW SERVICES (Mar. 6, 2007), https://ibls.com/internet_law_news_portal_
view.aspx?s=latestnews&id=1684.
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tion will explain that even if dating websites have knowledge of murderers and rapists on their websites, they need not remove them or warn
other users of them.23 Under current law, if one user murders another
user on a first date, the dating website is exempt from liability, despite
being essentially the proximate cause of that date.24
Section III endorses federal legislation mandating that fee-charging
dating websites screen all subscribers, both upon initial registration and
also on a specified periodic basis. This Section will recommend that the
CDA policy not be the controlling force in dating website immunity because the status of Internet progress and security has dramatically
changed since the CDA’s inception in 1996.25 The policies Congress used
to secure the CDA fifteen years ago stand on shaky ground today. To
balance the regulatory burden placed on the website provider, the proposal also precludes civil liability for dating websites that–despite proven
good faith efforts to screen users–inadvertently register felons or sex offenders who later harm users. This would strike a balance between
users’ and website operators’ competing interests and charge both parties with due diligence of safety.
In explaining this proposal, Section III will address both sides of the
screening debate. This Section will explain the pro-regulation’s safety argument as well as the anti-regulation’s argument that online dating regulation would impose undue burdens on the websites, actually
diminishing user safety.26 Moreover, this Section will analyze whether
an illegal invasion of privacy occurs when a website mandates a user to
divulge his or her criminal history. In sum, Section III will demonstrate
why the criminal screening argument is more persuasive than the noscreening argument. The public policy interests for screening are too immense for Congress to allow dating website operators to refuse protection
of paying users by hiding behind CDA immunity. Finally, Section IV will
conclude that screening legislation is likely inevitable; it is just a matter
of when legislators will recognize the necessity.
BACKGROUND
Online dating is the third most popular way for singles to
23. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that, “notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services [and] any effort by a service provider to investigate
and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and therefore create a stronger basis for liability”).
24. Id.
25. Ryan W. King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency Act of
1996 in Line With Sound Public Policy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24 (2003).
26. Online Dating, INTERNET ALLIANCE (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.internetalliance.
org/articles/online_dating.shtml.
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meet–more popular than bars, clubs, and social events.27 There are approximately fifteen hundred dating websites on the Internet.28 Dating
websites like Match, eHarmony.com (“eHarmony”), and Chemistry.com
(“Chemistry”) are open to anyone who subscribes and pays a monthly
fee.29 In addition to these traditional dating websites, the billion-dollar
online dating industry30 encompasses websites serving unique romance
interests including: TrekPassions.com,31 for StarTrek lovers;
AshleyMadison.com,32 for married people looking to have an affair; TallFriends.com,33 for tall singles and those wishing to date them; and
STDmatch.net,34 for daters who share common STDs. Approximately
twenty million Americans take advantage of these and other cyber
matchmakers.35 One in five relationships and one in six marriages are
the result of online dating.36
Dating websites traditionally issue surveys to users, asking users to
describe themselves and what they are looking for in a date or spouse.37
The website matches users based on common characteristics such as location, hobbies, and religion.38 The website may also allow users to assign different weight to characteristics and be matched accordingly. For
instance, if a user values high income above hair color, then that website
27. Steven Barboza, Digital Romance: The Business of Online Dating, ATLANTA POST, 1
(May 3, 2011), http://atlantapost.com/2011/05/03/digital-romance-the-business-of-onlinedating/ (reporting that the most popular way to meet is through workplace and school, and
the second is through friends and family; reporting further that most users are part of the
following online dating services: PlentyofFish, Zoosk, Manhunt, eHarmony, BeNaughty,
OKCupid, ChristianMingle, TRUE, and Badoo).
28. Id.
29. Paul Farhi, They Met Online, but Definitely Didn’t Click, THE WASHINGTON POST
(May 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/12/AR20
07051201350_pf.html (explaining why eHarmony.com rejects applicants).
30. Stefanie Rosenbloom, New Online-Date Detectives Can Unmask Mr. or Ms. Wrong,
NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/19date.html (explaining also that niche businesses have sprouted due to online dating and its associated
dangers, which include businesses that conduct private background checks on people for a
fee and even mobile phone apps) “Just plug in a couple of facts like a name and birth date.
ValiMate, the creator of the Instant National Criminal Search app, even allows users to
send the results of the check to a friend for added safety.” Id.
31. TREK PASSIONS, http://www.trekpassions.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (advertising free online dating for those interested in science fiction).
32. ASHLEY MADISON, http://www.ashleymadison.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2012) (advertising online dating for people already in a relationship).
33. TALL FRIENDS, http://www.tallfriends.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (advertising
as “the best and largest dating site for tall singles and tall admirers).
34. STDMATCH.NET, http://www.stdmatch.net/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
35. Rosenbloom, supra note 30.
36. Barboza, supra note 27.
37. Ed Grabianowski, How Online Dating Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Sept. 9, 2012),
http://people.howstuffworks.com/online-dating4.htm.
38. Id.
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will focus on income before hair color in creating matches.39 Some dating websites match users through multifaceted personality surveys and
mathematical algorithms.40 For example, eHarmony uses “twenty-nine
key dimensions that help predict compatibility and the potential for relationship success.”41 These matchmaking formulas do not take into account a user’s criminal history.42 Crime bureaus have not yet begun
recording crimes originating from online dating sources,43 but violent
stories like Carole Markin’s are peppered throughout the news; more go
unreported and unpublicized.44 The next two sections will explore state
attempts at online dating regulation and the current liability standing of
dating websites to users who sue them.
THE REGULATORY STATUS OF ONLINE DATING
The federal government does not regulate dating websites.45 However, states such as California, Florida, Michigan, New York, Ohio, New
Jersey, Virginia, and Texas have proposed or passed bills regulating dating website practices within their respective state boundaries.46 Most of
these bills or laws are similar to that of New Jersey’s Internet Dating
Safety Act (“Act”), the first legislation to regulate online dating.47 In
2008, New Jersey legislature created the Act to facilitate public awareness of the possible risks associated with online dating activities. The
Act states:
An Internet dating service offering services to New Jersey members
shall:
A. Provide safety awareness notification that includes, at minimum, a
list and description of safety measures reasonably designed to increase
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Hampson, supra note 21.
43. Rosenbloom, supra note 30.
44. Welcome to the Dangers of Internet Dating, DANGERS OF INTERNET DATING, http://
www.dangersofinternetdating.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (stating “[t]he
anonymity of internet dating has afforded con artists a new playground for scams, and has
allowed people to be anyone they think you want them to be because they are engaging you
primarily through the written word).
45. Arias, supra note 22 (noting, however, that some congressmen think there should
be federal regulation) “For instance, Alan Cropsey, a Michigan State Senator said, ‘It’s like
the wild, wild west out there.” Id.
46. Id.
47. Gordon Basichis, New Jersey Governor Signs First Online Dating Bill, HOPEFUL
ROMANTICS (Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.hopefulromantics.org/2008/01/new-jersey-governorsigns-first-online-dating-bill/. “While the law, signed on January 14th, 2008, doesn’t mandate background checks, it’s a step in the right direction. This law will raise help awareness about the potential risks of online dating, which most users either don’t know or don’t
want to know.” Id.
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awareness of safer dating practices as determined by the service. Examples of such notifications include:
(1) “Anyone who is able to commit identity theft can also falsify a dating
profile.”
(2) “There is no substitute for acting with caution when communicating
with any stranger who wants to meet you.”
(3) “Never include your last name, e-mail address, home address, phone
number, place of work, or any other identifying information in your Internet profile or initial e-mail messages. Stop communicating with anyone who pressures you for personal or financial information or attempts
in any way to trick you into revealing it.”
(4) “If you choose to have a face-to-face meeting with another member,
always tell someone in your family or a friend where you are going and
when you will return. Never agree to be picked up at your home. Always
provide your own transportation to and from your date and meet in a
public place with many people around.”48

New Jersey law does not require dating websites serving New Jersey
citizens to screen members, but it mandates that the website notify users
whether or not it does so. According to the New Jersey Safety Act:
If an Internet dating service conducts criminal background screenings,
then the service shall disclose whether it has a policy allowing a member who has been identified as having a criminal conviction to have access to its service to communicate with any New Jersey member; shall
state that criminal background screenings are not foolproof; that they
may give members a false sense of security; that they are not a perfect
safety solution; that criminals may circumvent even the most sophisticated search technology; that not all criminal records are public in all
states and not all databases are up to date; that only publicly available
convictions are included in the screening; and that screenings do not
cover other types of convictions or arrests or any convictions from foreign countries.49

Despite honorable efforts of state legislators, dating websites can
avoid such statutes by not advertising to citizens in those states.50
Other providers that do not conduct criminal background checks still
caution users of online dating risks through warnings listed within their
terms of service policies. Despite Match’s public promise to cross-check
subscribers’ names against public criminal databases, its terms of service explicitly warn that it does not currently conduct background
checks.51 At the same time, Match’s terms grant the website authority
to conduct criminal background checks at any time if it chooses.52 The
48. Internet Dating Safety Act, 2007 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 272 (West).
49. Id.
50. Arias, supra note 22.
51. Match.com Terms of Use Agreement, MATCH.COM (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.match.
com/registration/membagr.aspx?er=sessiontimeout.
52. Id.
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website does not reveal what would trigger Match’s operator to research
a user’s criminal history.53 Moreover, Match explicitly denies all liability for injury resulting from use of their website.54 Match states in its
terms:
[I]n no event shall Match.com be liable for any damages whatsoever,
whether direct, indirect, general, special, compensatory, consequential . . . relating to the conduct of you or anyone else in connection with
the use of the service, including without limitation, bodily injury, emotional distress, and/or any other damages resulting from communications or meetings with other registered users of this service or persons
you meet through this service.55

While most dating websites weasel out of background checking,
True.com, another dating website, screens every subscriber for felony
and sex offense convictions,56 without any legal obligation to do so.57
Upon registration, users provide their full name and date of birth.58 The
website then checks that information against state and county databases
for possible felony and sex offense convictions.59 Since True.com’s
(“True”) inception in 2003, the website has rejected approximately two to
three percent of potential subscribers through the screening process.60
“We turn away tens of thousands of felons [and] sex offenders . . . who,
despite our warnings, try to communicate with our True members. At
True, we take our members’ safety seriously. We don’t want felons [or]
sex offenders . . . on our website, period.”61
Unlike other dating websites, True does not bury safety information
in its terms of service; such information is easily accessible from the
homepage.62 There it reads: “We can’t guarantee criminals won’t get on
the Site, but we can guarantee they’ll be sorry if they do.”63 Additionally, True’s User Agreement reads: “I agree to adhere to the True Code of
53. Id.
54. Id. (clarifying that users are solely responsible for their actions with other members) “You understand that Match.com currently does not conduct criminal background
checks on its members . . . Match.com also does not inquire into the backgrounds of all of its
members or attempt to verify the statements of its members.” Id.
55. Id.
56. Heussner, supra note 3.
57. TRUE, http://true.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
58. Safer Dating Guidelines, TRUE (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.true.com/magazine/
saferdating_prosecute.htm.
59. Alissa Groeninger, State Urged to Lower Risks of Online Dating: Legislation Would
Require Sites to Disclose Whether They Do Background Checks on Clients, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-01-26/news/ct-met-online-dating-regulation-20120126_1_dating-services-background-checks-site.
60. Heussner, supra note 3.
61. Safer Dating Guidelines, supra note 58.
62. TRUE, supra note 57.
63. Id.
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Ethics and certify that: I have never been convicted of a felony or any
criminal offense characterized as a sexual offense.”64 In the event that
True discovers deceptive accounts, it can shut down that account, notify
law enforcement, and/or pursue criminal and civil action.65 True threatens prosecution of dishonest subscribers who are actually convicted
felons by way of the Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television federal statute,66 which authorizes fines of up to $250,000 and up to five years in
jail.67
The True model is an exception to the overwhelming non-screening
trend. For, as it stands, choosing neither to screen nor to inform users
about an inability to do so is completely legal–and quite possibly encouraged under the Communications Decency Act.
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IMMUNIZES DATING WEBSITES
FROM LIABILITY
Section 230 of the 1996 federal Communications Decency Act68
(“CDA”) currently shields dating websites69 from liability for matching
convicted felons with unwitting subscribers.70 The Good Samaritan
clause states that, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”71 An Internet Service
64. Safer Dating Guidelines, supra note 58.
65. Id.
66. Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West 2008), reading the
following:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or
both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized,
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in
section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined
not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
67. TRUE, supra note 57.
68. Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path
for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 565-67 (2009).
69. Doe v. Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (reading that “the
CDA’s immunity is not limited only to claims of defamation”). It has been applied to the
Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act, a Florida securities law and cyber-stalking law,
tortious interference and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
70. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
71. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
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Provider (ISP)72 is essentially any website provider. An information content provider is essentially a website or user providing substantive content to an ISP.73 Courts use a three-part test to determine if an ISP
enjoys CDA immunity: (1) whether the defendant provides an interactive
computer service, (2) whether another content provider supplies the information regarding the postings at issue, and (3) whether the plaintiff
seeks to treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of third-party
content.74
One of the pioneering cases in ISP immunity is Zeran v. AOL.75 One
week after the April 19, 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, an individual anonymously posted a message on an AOL virtual bulletin board advertising the sale of offensive tshirts related to the bombing.76 The post provided the plaintiff, Kenneth
Zeran’s, phone number for t-shirt inquiries and orders.77 In fact, Mr.
Zeran was not selling the offensive shirts and had no prior knowledge of
this prank.78 Angry calls flooded Zeran’s phone line, which served both
personal and business purposes.79 Zeran argued that once he notified
AOL of the defamatory content, AOL had a duty to remove the post in a
timely manner, notify subscribers of the false post, and screen for future
defamatory material, none of which AOL did.80
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Zeran and held that Section
230(c)(1) of the CDA bars liability of an ISP exercising publishers’ traditional editorial functions such as withdrawing, postponing, or altering
content.81 AOL was not liable for defamatory messages that users
72. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (defining an interactive computer service, also known as Internet service provider, as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer service, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions”).
73. Id. (defining an information content provider as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation of development of information provided
through the internet or any other interactive computer service”).
74. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D.
Va. 2008).
75. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
76. Id. at 329
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 333 (explaining that Zeran wanted to hold America Online liable for defamatory speech initiated by a third party).
81. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (articulating that “by its plain language, § 230 creates a
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service; specifically, § 230 precludes
courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role”).
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posted on its virtual bulletin boards, notwithstanding a lengthy delay in
removing the defamatory material.82 The court said that the CDA protects ISPs who have knowledge of illegal material posted on their websites and still choose not to delete it.83 The court also held that,
pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,84
any state law that violates Section 230 is void.85 In arriving at these
conclusions the Fourth Circuit cited legislative policy written within the
text of Section 230:
It is the policy of the United States
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter
and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means
of computer.86

In order to progress the fourth and fifth policy objectives concerning
self-regulation and law enforcement, Congress added a second prong to
the fifth policy, the Good Samaritan clause, of Section 230:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
A. Any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected; or
B. Any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
82. Id. at 327.
83. Id. at 333 “Notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the
dissemination of offensive material over their own services. Any effort by a service provider
to investigate and screen material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory material more frequently and therefore create a stronger basis for
liability.”
84. Id. at 334 (citing CDA language that “no cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section”).
85. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
86. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
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described in paragraph (1).87

Before Congress ratified CDA protection, an ISP’s good faith effort to
edit or remove material would have deemed it liable for that material’s
content.88 ISPs would then naturally limit user activity on the website,
thus discouraging free discourse among users.89 In Zeran, the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged that when Congress drafted the CDA, it recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits present to freedom of speech.90
Congress “considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”91 The court’s holding in Zeran was that a plaintiff may only sue
the user who wrote and/or posted false, misleading, or defamatory content, not the website displaying that content.92
The Zeran defamation case, which remains precedent for Section
230 ISP protection cases, was only the tip of the immunity iceberg. Since
Zeran, courts have stretched ISP immunity to causes of action beyond
defamation.93 Courts attach immunity to operators of social networking
websites, search engines, message boards, and shopping services.94 Immunity also now touches the online dating realm.95
In the 1999 Carafano case,96 an individual anonymously created a
fake dating profile on Matchmaker.com (“Matchmaker”) and posed as
Christianne Carafano, a popular actress.97 Carafano did not discover
the sham profile until she began receiving sexually explicit messages
and threats in response to her supposed profile.98 Carafano sued the
website for invasion of privacy, misappropriation of right of publicity,
defamation, and negligence.99 The Ninth Circuit held that even though
Matchmaker posted the false information, the website did not create it
and was therefore not liable for its falsity.100 “Matchmaker cannot be
87. Id.
88. DiMeo v. Tucker MAX, 433 F. Supp. 3d 523, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (providing an
example of New York’s holding that a service provider was liable because it screened and
edited messages on its bulletin boards; therefore, it was subject to strict liability).
89. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sarah Merritt, Sex, Lies, and MySpace, 18 ALB. J.J. SCI. & TECH. 593, 603-04
(2008).
93. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.
94. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Doe v. City of New York,
583 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y 2008); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501
(E.D. Pa. 2006).
95. Defterderian, supra note 68, at 565-78.
96. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1119.
97. Id. at 1121.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1122.
100. Id. at 1124.
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considered an ‘information content provider’ under the statute because
no profile has any content until a user actively creates it.”101
On the contrary, the court said that the website’s matching services
and e-mail notifications were precisely the type of continued Internet development Congress visualized when drafting Section 230.102 The court
plainly said that even though the questionnaire elicited information from
individuals, the user provided the information, so liability remained on
the user.103 Matchmaker’s act of collecting user responses and categorizing user characteristics “does not transform Matchmaker into a ‘developer’ of the ‘underlying misinformation.’ ”104
In 2007, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the above ISP immunity holdings
in Doe v. SexSearch.com.105 “John Doe” joined SexSearch, a niche dating
website for individuals seeking sexual encounters.106 Doe scheduled a
sexual encounter with “Jane Roe,” age eighteen according to her profile.107 It was not until police raided Doe’s home and arrested him in
December 2005 that he learned Roe’s true age of fourteen.108 Doe was
charged with three separate counts of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, which has a maximum sentence of fifteen years in
prison and a permanent sex offender status.109
Doe sued SexSearch claiming the following: breach of contract,
fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and failure to warn.110 SexSearch filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming CDA immunity.111 Doe responded that SexSearch reserved the
right to modify profile content if it did not meet website guidelines, thus
transforming SexSearch from service provider to content provider.112
Therefore, Doe maintained preclusion of CDA immunity.113 In granting
SexSearch’s motion to dismiss, the court held that, “while SexSearch
101. Id.
102. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123; see also Defterderian, supra note 68, at 565-78.
103. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (explaining that “the actual profile ‘information’ consisted of the particular options chosen and the additional essay answers provided. Matchmaker was not responsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice responses
with a set of physical characteristics, a group of essay answers, and a photograph”).
104. Id.
105. 105. Doe v. Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 726 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d, 551
F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 723.
111. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 724.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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may have reserved the right to modify the content of profiles in general,
Plaintiff does not allege SexSearch specifically modified Jane Roe’s profile, and is thus not an information content provider in this case.”114
Furthermore, SexSearch’s act of distributing, collecting, and posting a
profile that Jane Roe answered falsely did not deem the website a developer of the content therein.115 Once again, a judicial decision broadened
the scope of ISP immunity.
Courts have also established that a plaintiff cannot allege liability
by arguing that an ISP should have known that certain tools on the websites would advance illegal activity.116 ISP action must go beyond sheer
allowance and into intentional action.117 An ISP may lose CDA immunity only “if it ceases acting as a mere passive conduit and takes an active role in creating, screening, and/or editing the unlawful content.”118
Such was the case in Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc.,119 where the court precluded Section 230 ISP immunity for a dating website that allegedly created false profiles.120 The CDA “clearly does not immunize a defendant
from allegations that it created tortious content by itself, as the statute
only grants immunity when the information that forms the basis for the
state law claim has been provided by ‘another information content
provider.’”121
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit held in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com that a website that facilitates the development of unlawful content may lose Section 230 immunity if it
“contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.”122 In
that case, Roommates.com (“Roommates”) matched individuals renting
spare rooms with those seeking a place to live.123 The court declared
that Roommates’ profile creation process violated Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by requiring subscribers to choose from pre-populated
choices in answering questions regarding the user’s sex, family status,
114. Id. at 725
115. Id. at 725-26.
116. Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197-98 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
117. Id.
118. Richard B. Newman, Online Defamation and the Communications Decency Act,
SITEPRONEWS (June 15, 2011), http://www.sitepronews.com/2011/06/15/online-defamationand-the-communications-decency-act/ (noting that aside from certain narrow exceptions,
“website operators are not liable for the content posted by its users”).
119. Anthony v. Yahoo!, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
120. Newman, supra note 118 (noting that aside from certain narrow exceptions, “website operators are not liable for the content posted by its users”).
121. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
122. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008).
123. Id. at 1161.
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and sexual orientation.124 The court said that in this instance, “Roommates becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of that
information.”125
The current law for ISP liability is clear. There is neither federal nor
state law that mandates background screening.126 Moreover, Section
230 forbids ISP liability in the case of an unscreened user’s violent attack
on another user, absent a website intentionally providing illegal content.
This is because CDA public policy has nails dug deep in the judiciary,
making reform impossible without specific legislation.
ANALYSIS
In 1996, Congress set the bright line immunity standard, which
courts have since followed, citing Congressional intent, to grant immunity to ISPs.127 As stated, Congress enacted Section 230 to encourage
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the web, promote the development of e-commerce, and encourage ISPs and users of
such services to self-police their websites.128 However, as Roommates
and Yahoo! illustrated, ISPs are sometimes liable when they actively
elicit illegal material.129 Exactly where ISP immunity ends and where
liability begins is unsettled.130
True.com has pushed state governments to create legislation mandating that all online dating websites conduct background checks on
their members or carry a disclaimer stating that they do not.131 Criminal watch groups have praised the New Jersey legislature for answering
that call.132 “Millions of Americans look to online dating services every
day as a quick, easy, and what they believe to be a safe way to meet new
friends or find a partner,” said Laura A. Ahearn, Executive Director of
124. Id. at 1166.
125. Id.
126. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124.
127. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
128. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
129. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1157.
130. Badging: Section 230 Immunity In A Web 2.0 World, 123 HARV. L. REV. 981, 986
(2010).
131. Sarah Lacy, Dinner, Movie, Background Check, BUSINESS WEEK (May 9, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2005/tc2005059_8086_tc024.htm
(noting also that the American Civil Liberties Union argues that background checks violate
users’ privacy).
132. New Jersey Passes Bill to Make Online Dating Safer, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY
(Jan. 15, 2008) http://www.govtech.com/security/New-Jersey-Passes-Bill-to-Make.html?
topic=117671.
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the Crime Victims Center.133 “The Internet Dating Safety Act provides
the one crucial element to minimize victimization–information. New
Jersey lawmakers are to be commended for keeping our most vulnerable
safe, and every state in the nation should follow their lead.”134 While
True’s push for state regulation is a beginning, state legislation is not a
viable solution because adhering to fifty state laws would be too complex
and cost-ineffective for dating websites to remain in business. Instead,
the United States Congress must create cohesive legislation touching the
four corners of the country.135
CDA POLICY HAS GROWN STALE
The CDA essentially holds ISPs immune for the following activities:
hosting third-party content, exercising traditional editorial functions,
pre-screening objectionable content, paying third parties to submit content, and using drop-down forms or multiple choice questions if forms are
legal.136 These categories encompass broad activity and immunity
serves a grave disservice to victims of violence perpetrated through the
Internet.137 The government should not grant near-blanket immunity to
ISPs and website operators who do not screen people they are paid to
match. The policies Congress stated in 1996 may have been pertinent–even necessary–then, but many of the policy concerns have since
grown moot.138
The first congressional policy point supporting CDA immunity is the
promotion of Internet development.139 Since the CDA’s inception, the
Internet has grown exponentially. In 1996, thirty-six million people used
the Internet, or roughly .9 percent of the world’s population. Sixteen
years later, 2.11 billion people use the Internet, 30.4 percent of the
133. Id.
134. Id. (noting also that many people think their online dating service conducts background screening) “This mistaken belief can have disastrous results. The new law gives
consumers information they need to better make decisions on their safety.” Id..
135. Online Dating, supra note 26.
136. Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, CITIZEN
MEDIA LAW PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishers-under-communications-decency-act (noting that, “[r]elatively few court decisions, however, have analyzed the scope of this immunity in the context of ‘mixed content’
that is created jointly by the operator of the interactive service and a third party through
significant editing of content or the shaping of content by submission forms and dropdowns”).
137. Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why Section 230 Is
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet
Service Providers, 8 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3 (2007).
138. Ryan W. King, Online Defamation: Bringing the Communications Decency Act of
1996 in Line With Sound Public Policy, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 24 (2003).
139. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
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world’s population.140 Congressional coddling of the Internet and ISPs
is “no longer necessary because, far from fragile, they have become the
dominant means through which commerce is conducted.”141 The Internet provides countless services that were unforeseen during Section
230’s drafting, including interactive “services like YouTube, social
networking services like Facebook and MySpace and graphically rich
multiplayer games like World of Warcraft.”142 The Internet has grown
so much that the CDA’s rigid definitions of Internet Service Provider and
Information Content Provider do not account for the parties’ overlapping,
collaborative content development.143 Congress did not intend for the
CDA to create this “lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”144 Therefore, there should not be a general prohibition of ISP civil liability.”145
The second congressional policy of encouraging a free market unfettered by federal or state regulation146 is not only moot; it is irresponsible. Rather than supporting a cyber free-for-all, the government should
curtail what has become that lawless, no-man’s land,147 as the Ninth
Circuit described in Roommates. Dating website providers counter this
conclusion saying that dating profiles are a form of speech, something
the government always promotes.148 Therefore, they argue that the second CDA policy has not grown stale and should remain untouched. Yale
Law School Professor Jack Balkin argues accordingly:
[Section 230] has had enormous consequences for securing the vibrant
culture of freedom of expression we have on the Internet today. . . . Because online service providers are insulated from liability, they have
built a wide range of different applications and services that allow people to speak to each other and make things together. Section 230 is by
no means a perfect piece of legislation; it may be overprotective in some
respects and under-protective in others. But it has been valuable
140. Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.
com/emarketing.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (noting that Marshall McLuhan’s idea of a
“global village” has become a reality).
141. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
142. T. Barton Carter, Who is Safe in This Harbor? Rethinking Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, BOSTON UNIVERSITY FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY 7 (2010), http://
www.forumonpublicpolicy.com/archivespring08/carter.pdf.
143. Eric Weslander, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed Ambiguity
Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry [Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 292 (2008).
144. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
145. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d
666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003).
146. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
147. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164.
148. Badging: Section 230 Immunity In A Web 2.0 World, supra note 130, at 987.
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nevertheless.149

The conclusion one must draw from Professor Balkin’s view is that
when Congress weighed free speech against public safety, free speech
won.150 Inserting that conclusion into the online dating issue, he might
say that ex-felons and sex offenders enjoy free speech and thus should be
able to surf dating websites notwithstanding past indiscretions. While
free speech is undoubtedly a matter of great public interest and should
be protected, Congress cannot ignore the resounding interest of
safety.151 “The short answer to the fear that potential liability for ISPs
might chill or stunt online speech is that not all speech is supposed to go
unregulated.”152 Preying upon others is an activity that should be chilled.153 An unfettered Internet can be an unsafe Internet, and only Congress can safeguard its citizens from danger. Therefore, unfettered
Internet activity is no longer sound CDA policy.
Criminal background screening does not necessarily upset Congress’s third policy consideration–development of a user’s control over
what information he or she receives. Dating websites can still be innovative with user control while also screening for felons and sex offenders.
Dating websites that choose to allow felons and sex offenders on their
websites could place a warning on their profiles. This information would
afford users greater control over what they send and receive. Thus, websites would actually increase user control because the user is more informed than if no screening took place.
The fourth congressional policy–to encourage ISPs to regulate themselves154–is an anomaly. The CDA authorizes ISPs to ignore illegal
third-party activity on their websites. Congress, without any evidence,
has simply “assumed that if it immunizes ISPs and website operators
from liability, then those entities will screen content for defamatory material out of their own senses of altruism.”155
In Zeran, the court said that Congress had established a “tacit quid
pro quo” of offering interactive service providers broad immunity in exchange for their efforts to police themselves.156 On the contrary, ISPs
have no incentive to create blocking or filtration devices to protect their
149. Id.
150. Jeweler, supra note 137, at 3.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (1996).
155. Jeweler, supra note 137, at 3.
156. Cecilia Ziniri, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How
Zeran v. American Online Got it Right and Web 2.0 Proves it, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583,
587 (2008).
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users.157 To state this idea in practical terms, take for example the website, Vampersonals.com (“Vampersonals”), which is one of the largest
vampire and gothic dating websites on the Internet.158 Despite the
fairly bizarre nature of this dating website, the federal government does
not make the website screen its paying members.159 The government
assumes that Vampersonals on its own ensures that its vampire users
will not sink fangs into each other’s jugulars. Indeed, it is counterproductive to attempt to encourage these dating websites to self-regulate by immunizing them “regardless of whether the ISP attempts whatsoever to
be responsible and screen its content.”160
The final policy consideration–enforcement, punishment, and deterrence of law breaking–is contrary to the CDA’s effects.161 CDA immunity for dating websites precludes enforcement of laws and encourages
ISPs to allow obscenity, violence, stalking, and harassment. Returning to
the Vampersonals example, if one user viciously attacked another user
with a stake on the first date, Vampersonals would not be liable under
the CDA. The website would neither be responsible for enforcing laws
and deterring crime, nor for the assault that, but for the website, would
not have occurred.
In sum, the CDA should not be the end-all on possible ISP liability
because its policy scope is too broadly construed. There must be some
federal regulation on websites, and the CDA only works to refuse resolution for individuals harmed by online third-party content.162 Even if
Congress finds no cause to alter the CDA, it can create supplemental
legislation to mandate screening without amending the CDA. Under Section 230, ISPs already enjoy editorial immunity, meaning that they can
screen content prior to online upload without exposing themselves to
civil liability.163 The problem is that ISPs currently have no incentive to
screen content. Whether ISPs screen users by ethical choice or by legal
obligation would not change their editorially immune status under the
CDA. The fact that the “website provider has policies and procedures or
contract provisions to police its network does not lead to the conclusion
that the website operator is responsible for the content created by the
157. Jeweler, supra note 137, at 3.
158. VAMPERSONALS, http://www.vampersonals.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (touting
itself as “one of the largest gothic and vampire dating sites on the net, a place where you
can meet the vampire or goth (or both. . .!) of your dreams, as well as like-minded individuals in your area to spend time with, hang out, have fun and enjoy the darker sides of
(un)life”).
159. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124.
160. Jeweler, supra note 137, at 3.
161. Weslander, supra note 143, at 292.
162. Id.
163. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.
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third party.”164
Dating website legislation could mandate screening, and at the same
time, align with Section 230 by not punishing ISPs for inadvertent
screening inaccuracies. There are millions of online daters, and it would
be unreasonable to expect dating websites to catch every criminal. However, the CDA currently protects websites that make no attempt to
screen,165 which should be offensive to all online daters. An inability to
pledge flawless screening does not mean ISPs should be allowed to not
screen at all. Considering the many CDA policies-gone-moot, Congress
should plug the CDA gaps with safety regulation.
THE SCREENING DEBATE
CDA immunity is only one part of the criminal screening debate.
The other part asks if paid dating websites have an obligation to look for
new ways to provide a safe environment for their users. If they have an
obligation, should Congress determine what that obligation is and how it
is fulfilled? Too much regulation will stifle the spirit of choice involving
the online dating experience.166 Moreover, ISPs might avoid creating
dating web services for fear of liability stemming from user interaction.167 Doing so would repress free speech and Internet growth–two
consequences Congress intends to prevent.168 The issue essentially
breaks down into three elements: money, safety, and privacy.
The Internet Alliance, which represents dating websites in the fight
against federal regulation, believes regulation of online dating service
providers would impose unnecessary burdens on the industry and would
not improve user safety.169 Moreover, there are privacy implications
when a website requires users to disclose personal information such as
past crimes.170 In sum, the Internet Alliance and other ISPs of similar
mindset argue that it is enough for websites to display safety tips and
investigate suspicious activity and complaints.171
164. Samuel J. Morley, How Broad Is Web Publisher Immunity Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996?, 84 FLA. B.J. 8, 12 (2010).
165. Id.
166. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
167. Id.
168. Ziniri, supra note 156, at 601.
169. Online Dating, supra note 26.
170. Tom Ahearn, Online Dating Background Checks Fast and Easy But Not Always
Accurate, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING RESOURCES (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.esrcheck.com/
wordpress/2011/02/14/online-dating-background-checks-fast-and-easy-but-not-always-accurate/.
171. Online Dating, supra note 26.
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The Money Argument
Opponents of True’s screening legislation proposal say that True is
attempting to manipulate the online dating industry by destroying nonscreening competition.172 Additionally, the Internet Alliance says that
legislation would unfairly target online businesses, forcing them to pay
more than their offline counterparts.173 Most offline dating outlets, such
as newspaper singles advertisements and telephone-dating services, are
unregulated and not required to screen.174 The Internet Alliance argues
that online dating websites should not be forced to invest time and
money into screening just because their dating services are cyber, not
print.175
The Internet Alliance further contends that tasking dating websites
with criminal screening financially burdens them when users should investigate matches on their own.176 The group says that background
screening is too cost-ineffective to implement.177 However, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation provides free access to state sex offender
databases.178 Unlimited criminal background screening database
software can cost as little as twenty-five dollars per month.179 The Internet Alliance neither explains why such low cost is unduly burdensome, nor why that fee should be placed on already paying consumers
rather than the moneymaking service. Moreover, if it would be easier for
users to conduct their own screenings, then ISPs should display links to
aid research. However, they do not, which is probably because they do
not wish to draw attention to safety concerns.
Still, some dating websites consist of a single-digit staff and it would
be virtually impossible to screen millions of users. Nevertheless, insufficient staff numbers is not a persuasive reason to ignore basic safety owed
to a paying customer. These websites charge individuals a fee in exchange for a service. You get what you pay for–no fee, no screening. But
users who invest their money into these websites expect more from a
website than simple matching. After all, they could receive that same
minimal service from free dating websites. Instead, they are entitled to
172. Donna Leinwand, Background Checks Split Matchmaking Sites, USA TODAY (Dec.
12, 2005, 10:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2005-12-12-online-dating-checks_x.htm.
173. Online Dating, supra note 26.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Sex Offender Registry Websites, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://
www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/registry (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
179. Unlimited People Search, PEOPLE FINDERS, http://www.peoplefinders.com/checkout/offer.aspx?searchtype=membership (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
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an implied higher expectation, or at least a reasonable expectation that
the service will not match its paid user with a murderer. If the website
does not have enough money after advertising and registration profits to
conduct cursory background checks, then it should change its business
model, not forego user safety.
Matchmaking websites allocate time and money to conduct other
types of screening. Criminal screening could be added to already existing
screening procedures. For instance, eHarmony has rejected approximately one million people since its inception in 2000.180 The dating website screens applicants and rejects them for various reasons, including if
the applicant is separated but still married, if he or she is below twenty
years of age, or if the person was married more than twice.181
EHarmony also rejects applicants younger than sixty who have married
more than four times and those who score low on traits such as emotional management, family background (happy childhood), and character.182 Yet, the website does not screen for felons and sex offenders.183
Why not add one more step in the screening process–likely the most important part of the online dating process? A user would probably care
less if his match had been married than if she had murdered her exhusband.
The Safety Argument
The Internet Alliance contends that the safety argument unfairly favors online dating versus offline dating outlets like singles advertisements.184 The group argues that online dating is the same as meeting
someone in a bar; only online dating is less risky.185 The Internet Alliance argues that dating websites make the dating process safer because
online profiles supply users with more information than offline dating
180. Farhi, supra note 29 (reporting Greg Waldorf, eHarmony’s chief executive, as saying, “[w]e were founded with the mission to find happy, lasting relationships for people . . .
It pains me that we’re being put down or criticized for ensuring that we’re doing the best
job possible for our members”).
181. Your Question Answered: Why eHarmony Rejected You, EHARMONY BLOG (Aug. 12,
2006, 2:05 AM), http://eharmony-blog.com/104 (explaining that there are sections in the
test that ask: “if you have ill feelings in the last month, how you handle arguments, and
how good your relationship is with your parents”).
182. Id.
183. Terms of Service, EHARMONY (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.eharmony.com/about/
terms.
184. Online Dating, supra note 26 “Unregulated dating services are not a new phenomenon, running smoothly for years without legislative interference. Newspaper ads and single’s hotlines are quite common and frequently used, providing even less information to
interested parties about their potential date than is offered by a typical online profile.”
185. Online Dating, supra note 26.
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services.186 Users can then evaluate the person’s profile before talking
on the phone or agreeing to meet.187 The Internet Alliance further argues that a dating website that screens for felons and sex offenders
would actually expose its users to increased vulnerability.188 Public
criminal databases are not always accurate.189 Just because someone is
not on a criminal database does not mean he or she has not committed a
crime.190 The Internet Alliance suggests that users are lulled into a
false sense of security and will likely not conduct due diligence searches
of their own.191
The Internet Alliance’s argument is flawed. First, online dating
should be safer than meeting someone in a bar because bars merely provide a place for customers to eat and drink; meeting potential dates is
only a byproduct of that service.192 Dating websites like Match not only
provide a forum for users to mingle amongst themselves; their primary
service is to actively match their users.193 Moreover, if dating websites
tout themselves as being safer because they reveal more information
about prospects than meeting random people at bars, the websites
should include meaningful information–something more than income
level, physical characteristics, and a photograph.
Second, the anti-screening argument fails because it assumes that
users do not currently hold a false sense of security and would only acquire one if the website began screening. Is it worse to have a false sense
of security or no security at all? “I have dated other people on Match and
I’ve had good experiences,” Carole Markin of the Match lawsuit said.194
“I just didn’t expect that there would be somebody with a criminal background on the service. . . . When you’ve met nice, successful men previ186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (arguing that the “Internet as a dating medium can arguably make the experience safer, as individuals have the opportunity to assess relationship potential well before
a physical meeting occurs”).
189. Id.
190. Id. (contending that “education and common sense, rather than unworkable laws
and regulations, are the best way to protect consumers online”).
191. Online Dating, supra note 26.
192. April Braswell, Why Match Must Screen Singles Now, APRIL BRASWELL BLOG (May
5, 2011), http://aprilbraswell.com/blog/whymatchmustscreen.htm ([c]ontending that dating
websites “accept money from their clients to introduce people to each other. In which case,
for that fee then I do think they need to perform a few basic background checks. To check
prospective members against the sex crimes offenders registries seems like the basic level
of background search to be performed”).
193. Id.
194. Andrew Springer, Woman Suing Match.com Over Alleged Assault Comes Forward,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/us/woman-suing-match-alleged-assaultforward/story?id=13407806.
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ously on the same site, you just don’t assume the worst.”195 Carole
Markin mistakenly assumed that Match protected her from rapists.196
Unfortunately, Carole Markin is not alone. Each year, Internet
predators commit more than sixteen thousand abductions, one-hundred
murders and thousands of rapes stemming from online services, including dating websites.197 Yet, Internet dating advertisements focus on the
success stories rather than the horror stories.198 Consumers feed into
that hype because “people WANT to believe they are going to find what
they are looking for . . . and DON’T want to believe someone may be lying
to them.”199 This perhaps naive expectancy escalates when the website
charges for usage.200 Users naturally assume there is a difference between paid and unpaid services, and the major difference should be security.201 The Internet Alliance’s argument also assumes without
evidence that if websites screened applicants, users would be more reckless in their dating activities.
At the same time, the buyer must always beware and conduct personal investigations on his/her match. Many regulation opponents say
that background checks are not sophisticated or accurate enough to mandate.202 ISPs cannot possibly verify every applicant’s detail for completeness and accuracy. The Internet inherently welcomes imposters,
and there is no way to completely thwart deceit. Users must always take
responsibility for their safety. Nonetheless, database blips do not deem
screening a moot project. Laws are in place to deter, catch, and convict
criminals, yet crimes still occur. Law enforcement does not stop seeking
and punishing criminals just because crimes might still occur. New
Jersey’s legislature and others that have imposed online dating safety
regulation have obviously put a high price on safety. But does safety
trump privacy?
195. Id.
196. Braswell, supra note 192.
197. Tristan Watson, Online Dating is Deceptive and Dangerous, THE UNIVERSITY STAR
(Apr. 14, 2009, 6:38 PM), http://star.txstate.edu/node/524 (arguing that traditional dating
is safer than online dating) “Online dating is unsafe and can be deadly. Unfortunately, in
our society people seek to harm others and one way to do this is through the Internet.
Meeting people without the barrier of a computer will put structure back into the courtship
process.”Id.
198. Welcome to the Dangers of Internet Dating, supra note 44.
199. Id.
200. Braswell, supra note 192.
201. Id.
202. Leinwand, supra note 172 “Match.com spokeswoman Kristin Kelly says the rest of
the industry is ‘united against’ background checks, in part because such checks often are
incomplete and can give clients a false sense of security”
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The Privacy Argument
Opponents of online dating regulation say dating website users
should have the right to control what personal information they share,
including felony incarcerations.203 The argument goes that it is not the
government’s place to force them to disclose such private information.204
“The notion that we should be requiring yet another industry to do background checks is chilling,” said Barry Steinhart, director of the American
Civil Liberties Union’s Technology and Liberty Program.205 “It hurtles
us further into a surveillance society in which every action is going to be
investigated.”206
This argument can be quickly dispelled. Criminal convictions do not
merit invasion of privacy claims because convictions are considered public records.207 To have any interest in privacy, others must be excluded
from obtaining the private information.208 Moreover, this kind of disclosure is no different than what millions of private companies request on
job applications. Most public and private companies require criminal
background checks for jobs with children, the elderly, or disabled.209
In Jensen v. State, for instance, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
requiring home-health service aides to disclose criminal backgrounds
was not an intrusion on the aide’s privacy (in that case, even requiring
disclosure of expunged records).210 There, the defendant did not actively
breach the plaintiff’s “private sphere or somehow actively uncover hidden facts.”211 Instead, the defendant asked the plaintiff to disclose such
203. Juliana Olsson, Will Background Checks Reach Online Dating Sites?, ROCKET LAW(Apr. 19, 2011), http://legallyeasy.rocketlawyer.com/will-background-checks-reach-online-dating-sites-9751.
204. David Colker, Cupid Aims for Background Checks, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 25,
2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/25/business/fi-date25.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Elizabeth A. Gerlach, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting Applicants
with Criminal Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 999 (2006) (emphasizing that “if background checks are limited to revealing only convictions and not arrests that did not lead to convictions, the concern of privacy is greatly minimized”).
208. United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 225 F.3d
656 (4th Cir. 2000).
209. Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s Guide, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARING
HOUSE (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm (reporting that these
background checks may include the following: driving records, vehicle registration, criminal records, social security number, education records, court records, bankruptcy, character
references, medical records, property ownership, military records, drug test records, past
employers, sex offender lists, incarceration records, and more).
210. Jensen v. State, 72 P.3d 897, 903 (Idaho 2003).
211. Id.

YER
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facts that could be discovered upon the defendant’s research anyway.212
In the dating realm, the International Marriage Broker Regulation
Act requires a U.S. citizen seeking a foreign fiancé to undergo a criminal
background check before he or she can fly the fiancé to the United
States.213 Requiring background screenings for dating website subscription would move background screening requirements a minor step forward, helping to prevent violence and potentially saving lives.
In weighing the three main arguments of the screening debate–money, safety, and privacy–the answer is clear: dating websites
must screen their users. Although paid websites have no legal duty to
keep their users safe, such duty is implied. Users have a reasonable expectation that websites will attempt to preserve their safety. As long as
online dating websites fail to screen their users, twenty million Americans are at the whim of these unregulated services.214 The federal government must start proposing solutions.
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
In light of these overwhelming user safety concerns, Congress
should draft federal legislation mandating that every fee-charging dating website conduct criminal background checks. The legislation should
provide the following:
After an applicant registers on a dating website, the ISP shall run
the name through public and/or private criminal and sex offender
databases. Fee-charging dating websites shall prescreen their members
and update profiles accordingly, every 365 days. If the website finds that
an applicant has been convicted of a felony or sex offense, it has two
options: 1) ban the offender from the website; or 2) notify users on the
sex-offender/felon’s profile page. The notification does not have to be obtrusive in size, shape, color, or font. Instead, the notification need only to
be visible enough for a reasonable person to locate it on the page. Moreover, the notification need not state the name of the crime, convicting jurisdiction, or the date the crime occurred.
Further, a dating website shall retain business records of all felony
and sex offender searches it runs. If the ISP can show it prescreened all
members upon subscription and screened them every 365 days thereafter, users will be precluded from civil liability in cases of violence against
212. Id.
213. Holli B. Newsome, Mail Dominance: A Critical Look at the International Marriage
Broker Regulation Act and Its Sufficiency in Curtailing Mail-Order Bride Domestic Abuse,
29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 291, 304 (2007) (reporting Congress created the International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005 in response to two Washington mail-order bride
murders. The Act requires “marriage brokers” to provide mail-order brides with information regarding violent criminal histories of marriage broker service users.).
214. Rosenbloom, supra note 30.
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them. If the website conducted the search and a flaw occurred in the
criminal database, then CDA Section 230 immunity will be upheld. If the
ISP did not conduct any search, then immunity is precluded.
Take, for example, if this proposal was enacted and Carole Markin
had sued Match. If Match could prove through records conducted in the
course of business that it had criminally screened Alan Wurtzel, but did
not find a sexual offense conviction, Match could assert a “pre-screening”
affirmative defense and the case would be dismissed. If, on the other
hand, Match had not conducted background searches, it would be exposed to liability. Simply stated, if the ISP cannot show that it attempted
to keep users safe by conducting a two-minute background check, then
immunity should not apply.
Though dating website operators may argue that this proposal is too
strict, it actually offers middle-of-the-road regulation, balancing safety
concerns with business cost concerns. Such legislation would still place
buyer-beware onus on the user because he or she could not recover if the
website conducted screenings. At the same time, this legislation merely
injects slight regulation into an entirely unregulated arena. Through
mandatory screening, ISPs would be forced to take responsibility–the
kind of responsibility that the CDA currently impedes.
CONCLUSION
Like many online activities, online dating can be a valuable resource
if used appropriately. While online dating websites bring people together
that might not otherwise meet, the outcome is not always positive. For
Carole Markin’s sake, user safety must remain a primary concern.
The legislation proposed in this comment encourages ISPs to promote user safety by mandating that they expose dangerous subscribers.
The CDA should not continuously shield ISPs because Congress did not
intend for the CDA to license cyber anarchy.215 ISPs cannot protest that
safety regulation is inherently unfair and unduly burdensome. Dating
websites are businesses. Like any other business, ISPs must stand behind their service–in this case, sparking romance between users. As
Linda R. Greenstein, a proponent of New Jersey’s Internet Dating Safety
Act, states: “People who turn to the Internet to build new friendships and
relationships deserve peace of mind that the person with whom they
wish to form a connection is who they claim to be.”216
215. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003).
216. New Jersey Passes Bill to Make Online Dating Safer, supra note 132 (boasting that
“the legislation arms consumers with valuable information by requiring Internet dating
companies to disclose the extent of their safety measures, such as if they do or do not conduct background screenings on members who are seeking to date each other. . . doing so
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ISPs may not be able to guarantee that a woman is every pound she
claims to be, or that a man has every hair on his head that his picture
portrays. They cannot guarantee against lousy dates, scams artists, or
even violent attacks on their users. But the one thing all users should
always be able to count on is that their dating service will not knowingly
place them in harm’s way. Websites like Match do not sweat over protecting their customers because they currently carry no liability. Congress will one day implement online dating regulation when safety
concerns become too evident to ignore. The question remains: How many
innocent people must be sacrificed before that time comes?
allows consumers to make more informed decisions regarding the online dating provider
they choose to use”).

